

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

REF ID: A9000000000000000000000000000000

Chief of Station, Germany	ALBUE: []	S.R.C.P. P.D.R.P.
Chief of Base, Munich		
Chief of Base, Frankfurt		
Chief, SR		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REASON/ACTOR		SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES B1 CLOSURE ACT
Journal of Project ALBUE for Fiscal 1960		DATE 2007
Field Comments		74-126-W/1

REF ID: A900-1172
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

18 NOV 1959

<input type="checkbox"/>	RE "CSA" - KREK "X" ONE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. Primarily on the basis of []'s memorandum in defense of the Project, written at Headquarters several months ago, it has been decided to request renewal of ALBUE as it stands for Fiscal 1960. (Copies of memorandum are attached.) The renewal dates of KUMAR projects are staggered. ALBUE comes up ca 17 November. We are requesting a total of [] for the newspaper and \$7,000 for KUMAR operations.
2. It has been noted that ALBUE in the past has been handled in a fractionized manner at Headquarters and has, to some extent, suffered from a lack of continuous, across-the-board interest as a result. We have, therefore, centralized responsibility for all aspects of the Project in SR/3-PP and expect that its management from one desk and as one homogeneous Project will improve its efforts.
3. Judging from the correspondence, the Project's sole continuing activities at the present time are publication and distribution of the newspaper and the Radio Madrid broadcasts, other programs having been terminated at various times. As you will note from the budget breakdown above, Headquarters is interested in reviving ARCAMBISTA 1 potential in the KUMAR field and is hopeful of doing so, provided the Field believes there is sufficient potential. We have in mind KUMAR operations of the following types: (1) contact of Soviets coming out (see MEMO-592); (2) operations based on ARCAMBISTA 1 members and other Byelorussians and third national contacts going in.
4. Here at Headquarters we have a rather imprecise picture of what the operational potentialities of ARCAMBISTA 1 are at this juncture. Again judging from the correspondence, there has been considerable shifting of the group's personnel since the early MEMORANDUM days. We should therefore appreciate a survey both of ARCAMBISTA 1's present active operational apparatus and how it fits together and of potential personnel and operational opportunity, both in the KUMAR and KUMAR fields. A clearer picture of what the Project provides in the way of tools will improve Headquarters' capability for providing support and realistic comment. Although [] might well be able to fill most of the above requirement on the basis of his long and recent association with the Project, it might be worth considering an operational reappraisal of the organization with ARCAMBISTA 1 himself in order to bring our knowledge of his organization up to date.
5. We do feel ready at this time to comment tentatively on ARCAMBISTA 1's request for \$4,000 for the Radio Madrid broadcasts. As a matter of economy we would prefer not to consider the request favorably for this year at least. According to our information, the Radio is undergoing a serious reorganization on the administrative level, the outcome of which is not at all certain. Moreover, we would prefer to see what ARCAMBISTA 1 can accomplish in contact and other KUMAR operations prior to considering significant expansion of the group's KUMAR-sponsored EUCAGE program. Nevertheless, our attitude on this subject is flexible, and if the Field is able to present new information in favor of the program, we would be glad to reconsider our position.
6. As you know, KUMAR is now in the process of paying off some \$32,000 in death benefits from the ARCAPOSARIO operations. As you also know, about a year ago KUMAR gave ARCAMBISTA 1 its approval to his plan to set up a Byelorussian historical-memorial center in New York City. He would pay for this center with the \$32,000 plus similar monies previously collected from KUMAR and with funds gathered from other sources. Although we are certainly obligated to pay the

CS COPY

74-126-44/1

FORM 500
MAY 1957
GSAUSE PREVIOUS EDITION.
REPLACES FORMS
G-120, G-122A AND G-123
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

 CONTINUED

S.R.C.P. P.D.P.

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

REF ID: A61181

S-E-C-R-E-T

ECOW-1172

\$32,000 eventually, we are holding up the payment temporarily pending the conclusion of our current operational review of the Project with you. There might well be a more productive way for AECAMBISIA I. to invest these funds, both for the accomplishment of its own objectives and KUBANK's, too.

7. We have addressed this dispatch to German Station Headquarters because we wish to insure that all pertinent Station assets are used to get as comprehensive a picture as possible of AEQUOR's merits. We suggest that in addition to [] provide from his large fund of background knowledge, personalia and his assessment regarding AECAMBISIA I. assets in various parts of the world and that the Station, in consultation with MOB and FOB, give Headquarters the benefit of its recommendations as to how AEQUOR may be more efficiently administered in the future.

Attachment:

Memorandum HARENTH

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - COS, Germany, v/2 cc. att. a/s ✓ 1 - RI, v/att. a/s
2 - MOB, v/2 cc. att. a/s 2 - SR/3, v/att. a/s
2 - FOB, v/2 cc. att. a/s

CS COPY

FORM 53c
10-67
(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
REPLACED FORMS
01-68, 01-69A AND 01-69
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

REF ID:



CONTINUED

S E C R E T

the first time, and the first time I have seen it. It is a very large tree, and has a very large trunk. The bark is rough and textured, and the leaves are large and green. The tree is located in a park, and there are other trees and bushes around it. The sky is clear and blue, and the sun is shining brightly. The overall atmosphere is peaceful and serene.

of radiation as well as the
classical theory of the
electron. The electron is
known to have a mass and
inertia and it is also
the source of a magnetic
field which can be measured
if the right apparatus
is used. The electron
turns out to be a very
light particle and it is
also found to have a
negligible mass and
size. It is also
found to have
other properties
corresponding to
baryons.
At present
there is no
evidence for
the existence
of the electron
in the classical
sense. The
electron is
known to have
a mass and
inertia and it is also
the source of a magnetic
field which can be measured
if the right apparatus
is used. The electron
turns out to be a very
light particle and it is
also found to have a
negligible mass and
size. It is also
found to have
other properties
corresponding to
baryons.
BS COPY

and the other day I was in the city and I saw a man who had a very large
handful of money in his pocket. He was walking down the street and he was wearing a
suit and tie. I thought to myself, "This is a rich man." But then I realized that he was
actually poor because he was carrying so much cash. I also noticed that he was wearing
old clothes and that his shoes were dirty. I thought to myself, "This is a poor man."
I then realized that it's not always easy to tell if someone is rich or poor just by
looking at them. It's important to remember that wealth is not just about how much
money you have, but also about how you use it and what you do with it. The man
with the large amount of cash may be rich, but if he's not using it wisely, he may be
poor. On the other hand, the man with the small amount of cash may be poor,
but if he's using it wisely, he may be rich. It's important to remember that wealth
is not just about how much money you have, but also about how you use it and what you do with it.

- 3 -

5. In December 1959 KUBARK I sent word to the SWB that in addition to the Byelorussian language broadcasts over Radio Moscow, there would be a series of broadcasts in Byelorussian. Technical arrangements of these broadcasts in Poland do not seem to be good. Various letters have been received from Poland reporting that these broadcasts are difficult or impossible. Little has been done to continue these broadcasts. The protocol day may be Jerrying a few and gradually employed until it begins with the hope that things will one day be continue this going and reflect a KUBARK effort. Radio Dzidz was used by ANGARISTI I for this effort. We have in the index one of 6,000 new year in order to pay the salaries of the ANGARISTI I employees who devote their full time on these broadcasts and cover all other costs of broadcasting. It should be noted that there are no AM or Byelorussian nationalist broadcasts in the Byelorussian language in existence. (Note: the Byelorussian broadcasts over Radio Liberator are not national in content and are officially characterized to occur with a non-offensive policy toward the nationality issue.) These broadcasts over Radio Moscow are not currently being carried by the Spanish government. Unless the KUBARK side of the ANGARISTI project is removed, ANGARISTI I will in the immediate future be obliged to discontinue this successful and popular KUBARK effort in a last ditch effort to keep the ANGARISTI I newspaper alive a little longer. It should also be reiterated that our ANGARISTI I contacts, quite unlike most AM and pre contacts engaged in KUBARK activities, have repeatedly offered to take care of this effort.

6. The effective Byelorussian intelligence for KUBARK purposes consists of three treaty ANGARISTI I agents. All of the ANGARISTI I members with whom KUBARK has been in contact have proven in many ways to be more fully cooperative than some of their opposite numbers in other espionage groups. This has been the case particularly since ANGARISTI I has no significant rival espionage groups to recruit them (especially) of those found in Warsaw. They have no qualms about bombing over populated areas or launching bombs to our exclusive management and do it by feel that their political mission precludes leaving high priority KUBARK requirements on any of those operations in the USSR or Poland.

7. Regarding the ANGARISTI operations did not work out well, a certain amount of blame for uncooperativeness can be placed on ANGARISTI I on the hypothesis that if we had had more contact with ANGARISTI I the operation would have been successful. Since this has morally been the first and only contact operation which we have mounted using ANGARISTI I, at this stage it is precipitous to make a final judgment on ANGARISTI I's effectiveness on the basis of one complex meeting and one KUBARK effort that she conducted.

8. Under present circumstances, contact operations, using ANGARISTI I, can be expected to yield only modest results because ANGARISTI I does not have travel abroad are most likely to appear. We note that the head of ANGARISTI I lives in Paris and not regard this statement since he is too occupied with other activities and is too well known to be useful in making clandestine cold Russia who travel. already. There are also some Byelorussians who appear in Europe or PRAGUE, anticipated traveling to Warsaw in the fall of 1960; it is believed that he can be expected to undertake a follow-up of the initial ANGARISTI operation, if this should be deemed desirable. The lack of funds available to ANGARISTI I has been the main obstacle in maintaining an concerted program of contact operations. ANGARISTI I does have young men who are qualified to carry total effort. He has been also documented in the Soviet authorities, ANGARISTI I appears to have some settled contacts in the Polish side of town in Warsaw, but to date KUBARK has undertaken no effort to approach them or to conduct them for operations from the USSR.

9. One of the most difficult areas of KUBARK operations is the transition from the SWB to the AM. This is due to the fact that the AM is now operating, continuing the same operations, and continuing the continuation of the joint venture between the SWB and the AM. Accordingly the result of reports concerning this situation is that the SWB has not been able to influence the AM to change its position. But this is not true. One of objective bases in continuing operations is the SWB's continued support of the AM's operations. This is reflected in the

[]

In the final analysis the issue rather than an imagined KUCAK's ineffectiveness is KUCAK'S OBSTACLES which has managed to do a lot with a very small subsidy. It should be added here that the OBSTACLES program of supporting the KUCAK efforts of the Latvians and Estonians and other groups undoubtedly costs many times more than the full subsidy of \$12,000--only because there are more ESTONIANS (and KUCAK supporters) who are familiar with the issue of nationalism in these Baltic areas than such the population represented by these Baltic ethnic groups (4,500,000) which is less than half the size of the KUCAK's population. The problem of nationalist evaluations is substantially no different in Byelorussian than it is in the Baltic lands. Similarly, the potential usefulness of the Byelorussians in particular and the USSR is no less important than that of the Baltic nationalities.

C. IMPLICATIONS: If it is in the interest of KUCAK to run KUCAK or KUCAK's activities into the third largest republic of the USSR, the BYER, there is only one organization which shows any capability in this direction, i.e., GRU/3. It is submitted that the proofs of OBSTACLES' ineffectiveness are much weaker now however than those of the other three ethnic groups (which have also got about a million dollars of KUCAK money). Furthermore, since the KUCAK projects have not stood up well in their KUCAK production as well as USG/3's paramilitary patrols, it would now more reasonable to use a different approach to judge the OBSTACLES & KUCAK case. In view of the above, the following recommendations:

A. That the AEROMARINE subsidy be continued and that it be increased to the sum of not more than [] and not less than [] in order to permit the continuation of operation of the KUCAK activities which are currently proving ineffective and in order to permit mounting some contact operations directed at Byelorussians travelling in Europe.

B. That favorable consideration be given to subsidizing the Byelorussian language broadcasts over Radio Minsk to the sum of \$4,000.

C. That the lack of success in one contact operation (the failure of which may or may not be fully attributable to AEROMARINE himself) should not be considered an adequate reason to cancel the entire AEROMARINE KUCAK project or be considered an adequate gauge for predicting the results of future contact operations.

D. That, since the nature of the past AEROMARINE activities and the future outlook for this project are similar to those being handled by GRU/3, further handling of Project AEROMARINE be transferred from DIB to GRU/3. (It has never been clear to the writer why Project AEROMARINE was not transferred into a KUCAK project under GRU/3 at the same time and for the same reasons that AEROMARINE was.)

[]

CONFIDENTIAL